Abstract. In the first part of this article I describe the construction of cryptosystems using elliptic curves, discuss the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (upon which the security of all elliptic curve cryptosystems rests), and survey the different types of elliptic curves that can be chosen for cryptographic applications. In the second part I describe three unsuccessful approaches to breaking various cryptosystems by means of liftings to global elliptic curves. I explain how the failure of these attacks is caused by fundamental properties of the global curves.
Introduction
The extensive use of number theory and algebraic geometry in cryptography is a relatively recent phenomenon; it followed the invention of public key cryptography in the 1970's [8] . The central idea in public key cryptography is that of "one-way" and "trapdoor" functions. A one-way function is a one-to-one function y = f (x) such that f (x) can be efficiently computed using publicly available information, but x = f −1 (y) cannot be. A trapdoor function is a one-way function that ceases to be one-way if one is in possession of a "secret key." The most famous example of a one-way function is the map (p, q) → N = pq on the set of pairs of prime numbers; the computation of f −1 requires one to solve the integer factorization problem. The most famous example of a trapdoor function is the exponentiation y ≡ x e (mod N ), where N is the product of two secret primes and e is a fixed exponent prime to ϕ(N ). A decryption exponent d such that x ≡ y d (mod N ) cannot be found by someone who does not know the secret prime divisors of N . This trapdoor function is the basis of RSA cryptography, which is still the most widely used public key system, although it is being increasingly challenged by elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
The first half of the present paper is concerned with the use of elliptic curves over finite fields to construct public key cryptosystems. After some historical remarks, I describe methods of message transmission and digital signature using elliptic curves. In §4 I discuss the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), upon which the security of all elliptic curve cryptosystems rests, and I briefly compare ECC with RSA and also with hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. In §5 I list several classes of elliptic curves that are suitable for ECC and mention some open questions that have an intrinsic aesthetic appeal as well as cryptographic importance.
The second half of the paper discusses three approaches to breaking ECC and other cryptosystems by means of liftings to global elliptic curves. I show how fundamental properties of global curves in each case lead to complete failure of the attack. In §6, following [36] and [52] , I explain why index calculus methods are not likely to work on elliptic curves; in §7, following [16] , I discuss the failure of J. Silverman's xedni calculus attack; and in §8, following [19] , I explain the futility of the torsion-subgroup attack in [6] . Experience of the last few years has given reason for skepticism about the possibility of using global curves to mount a successful attack on a cryptosystem.
The Beginnings in 1985: Elliptic Curves Enter Cryptography
In late 1984, Hendrik Lenstra circulated an outline of a new method of integer factorization using elliptic curves. That was the first time that elliptic curves were used in cryptography. I will not discuss factorization here; the interested reader is referred to [30] .
In early 1985 I was in Moscow as part of the Soviet-American exchange program between the two Academies of Sciences. At that time I was only beginning to be interested in cryptography. Prompted by Lenstra's factorization method, I started studying the use of elliptic curves to construct cryptosystems. I did not know anyone in Moscow who worked in cryptography -Soviet work in that area was never done in the open -so I wrote about my ideas to Andrew Odlyzko (then at Bell Labs). He replied that my proposed cryptosystem sounded promising, and in fact Victor Miller (then at I.B.M.) had thought of the same idea independently at the same time.
At first neither Vic nor I thought that elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) would become a practical form of real-world cryptography anytime soon. Neither of us applied for patents. In my case this is not surprising, since I am opposed in principle to patenting mathematical algorithms. What is surprising -in view of the fact that I.B.M., like most American companies, wants its employees to get as many patents as possible, even ridiculous ones -is that my coinventor did not patent ECC either.
In February 1985, I was invited to speak at the Moscow Mathematical Society. For my topic I chose public key cryptography. I did not mention ECC (this was before my correspondence with Odlyzko), but rather talked about the RSA and Diffie-Hellman systems, index calculus methods for attacking both of them, and various uses for public key cryptography. This was a time of great Cold War tension, and there was something ironical about the first talk I gave on cryptography being in Moscow, and about the first talk on cryptography at a Moscow Math Society meeting being given by an American.
I was very nervous about the talk, but that had nothing to do with the strangeness of an American talking about cryptography in the Soviet Union. Rather, I was nervous because of all the eminent mathematicians who would be thereluminaries like Shafarevich, Manin, Arnold, and Kirillov. I had never given a talk in Russian in front of a such a large group, and I had never given a talk in any language in front of so many famous people. Moreover, I was only a beginner in cryptography -my only justification for giving a talk on this subject was that Soviet mathematicians (except for a few who worked in secret) knew even less about cryptography than I did.
I tried to follow the advice that Manin had given me a decade earlier, when I was apprehensive about giving a talk for the first time in Russian (it was in his seminar). He explained to me how to prepare carefully so as always to have on the blackboard what is most important and what one needs to refer to. To me, Manin was a model of brilliant exposition and lecture style.
My talk at the Moscow Math Society, although not nearly of the calibre of a Manin lecture, was successful. Many years later I met an expert on cryptography who in 1985 had been working for the KGB and had attended my talk. He told me that the talk had been at a higher level than he had expected, and one of the topics I discussed -the possible use of public key cryptography in nuclear test ban verification -had been completely new to him.
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Suppose that we are given an elliptic curve E over a field F :
(It must be smooth, i. e., the cubic on the right has no multiple roots; also, one needs a slightly different form in characteristic 2 or 3.) The points x, y ∈ F that satisfy this equation, together with a "point at infinity" denoted O, form an abelian group whose identity element is O.
3.1. How to use elliptic curves to send a message. We assume that we have a way to convert the message (i. e., a block of text) to a large integer, and then to a point M on an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field F q . The equation of the curve and the coordinates of a fixed point P are publicly known parameters of the system. In most applications P is a point whose order is a large prime . Traditionally, in cryptography one uses the names Alice and Bob to refer to two users of the system. Suppose that Alice wants to be able to receive messages. She has two keys: her secret key is a random integer x; her public key is the point Q = xP . Bob wants to send the message M to Alice. He chooses a random integer k, computes kP and kQ, and sends the pair of points
That is, the message is "disguised" by adding the point kQ to it; but since this point is equal to xkP , Alice can remove the disguise by multiplying the first point of the pair by her secret x:
3.2. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Let E be an elliptic curve defined over F q such that #E(F q ) is equal to a very large prime (or to a small integer factor times such a prime ). Let P be an F q -point of E of order . Let f E : E(F q ) → F be a fixed, easily computable function that spreads the points over F fairly evenly. For example, if q is a prime p, f E could be the residue mod of the x-coordinate of a point (regarded as an integer between 0 and p − 1). Let H be a "hash function," i. e., an easily computable function from the space of message units to F . It must have certain randomness properties, and it must be impossible in practice to find preimages of an element in F or even to find two message units that map to the same element of F .
Alice wants to sign a message that she is sending to Bob. Her secret key is a random integer x in the range 1 < x < . Alice's public key is then the point Q = xP ∈ E(F q ). To sign a message M , Alice does the following:
1) she selects a random integer k in the range 1 < k < ; 2) she computes kP and r = f E (kP ); 3) she computes k −1 ∈ F and
4) her signature for the message M is the pair (r, s). To verify the signature, Bob computes
and then
If f E (u 1 P + u 2 Q) = r, he accepts the signature.
The Discrete Log Problem
Definition 1. The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in the group G to the base g ∈ G is the problem, given y ∈ G, of finding an integer x such that g x = y (xg = y if the group operation in G is written additively), if such an integer exists (i. e., if y is in the subgroup generated by g).
The Discrete Log Problem in the multiplicative group F × q is what we need to solve if we want to invert the function
where g ∈ F × q is a fixed element and x is an integer (modulo the order of g). This map x → g x is the one-way function used in so-called Diffie-Hellman cryptosystems. For example, the U.S. government's first Digital Signature Standard (introduced in 1991) is such a system. Similarly, if E is any elliptic curve defined over F q , then we have the following function in the elliptic curve group:
where P is a fixed point of E and x is an integer. In this case, the DLP is the problem, given Q ∈ E(F q ), of finding an integer x such that Q = xP if such an integer exists. The security of all elliptic curve cryptosystems depends on the presumed intractability of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP).
4.1.
Hardness of the DLP. The DLP in the multiplicative group of a well chosen finite field F q is hard: in practice, it seems to require about the same amount of time as factorization of an integer of approximately the same size as the finite field. However, there are many subexponential-time 1 algorithms for both of these problems. Until about 1990, the best algorithms to factor an integer N had running time of the form exp((log N ) 1/2+ε ).
In the last decade, with the "number field sieve" and the "function field sieve" the heuristic asymptotic running time has been reduced to
in the case of factoring (see [31] ) and to a similar bound (with N replaced by q) for the DLP in most fields F q that are used in practice (see [53] ). In contrast, no subexponential-time algorithm is known for the ECDLP except in the following special cases:
• there is no large prime dividing #E(F q );
• there is a large prime , but it also divides q K − 1 for a very small value of K (in which case Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone [37] showed how the elliptic curve group can be imbedded in F × q K ); or • F q is a prime field F p , and #E(F p ) = p (in which case several authors [45] , [50] , [43] showed how the elliptic curve group can be imbedded in F + p ). The last two cases are very easy to avoid in practice; to avoid the first condition requires a little more effort. That is, we need the order of the group to be divisible by a very large prime -perhaps even to be prime itself.
Recently an attack called "Weil descent" has been developed, based on ideas of G. Frey (see [12] ). This approach to the ECDLP uses a reduction from the elliptic curve group to the jacobian group of a hyperelliptic curve. In practice, Weil descent seems to work in only a relatively small number of cases, and even then it does not give a subexponential-time algorithm. However, there are some situations when it gives a faster solution to the ECDLP than any other known method (see [17] ). In order to completely avoid the possibility of a Weil descent attack, it is prudent not to work over composite-degree extension fields such as F 2 mn , m, n > 1.
Advantages of elliptic curves.
The most important advantage of ECC over competing systems such as RSA is that there is no known subexponential-time algorithm for the discrete log problem on a suitably chosen curve. The "Pollard ρ method," which is the best one known for solving the ECDLP, requires roughly √ operations, where is the largest prime factor of #E(F q ). Using the number field sieve, an integer N of 155 decimal digits was recently factored; however, in the case of ECC the record size of an elliptic curve group in which the ECDLP has been solved is 33 digits. Therefore, in ECC one can use shorter key sizes than in RSA. A secondary advantage of ECC is that there are many, many curves to choose from. Besides RSA, it is also interesting to compare ECC with cryptosystems constructed using hyperelliptic curves of genus g > 1. When I proposed this type of cryptosystem in [23] , I thought that, because of the greater complexity of the groups being used, high-genus curves might eventually have a security advantage over elliptic curve groups. However, to my surprise the reverse seems to be the case.
The group used -the jacobian variety of the curve -is the function field analog of the class group of a quadratic field. On the one hand, this leads to fairly simple rules for the group operation, by analogy with composition of quadratic forms in the number field case. However, this analogy also leads to a subexponential-time algorithm for solving the Discrete Log Problem in the group when the genus is large. This was first done by Adleman-Huang [1] . More recently, Gaudry [11] has shown that when g > 4 one can solve the hyperelliptic DLP more quickly than a comparable ECDLP. Thus, at present it would not be prudent to use hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems except for g = 2, 3, 4.
Even though hyperelliptic curves of genus 2, 3, 4 give us groups which seem to be as secure as elliptic curve groups of comparable size, there is no known practical advantage in using them. In terms both of security and efficiency, it seems that hyperelliptic curves are worse than or equal to elliptic curves. Nevertheless, hyperelliptic curve cryptography is a popular topic of research, and perhaps some day someone will discover a practical application where such cryptosystems have an advantage over ECC.
Approaches to Looking for a Curve of Nearly Prime Order
There are several different approaches to selecting a suitable elliptic curve, where "suitable" means, in particular, that the group is of nearly prime order. The basic questions to be answered are:
(a) What field do I want to work over? (b) Should I select the coefficients of the defining equation of the curve at random, or should I use a curve with special properties?
To answer question (b) one has to decide what stand to take in a philosophical dispute between two points of view:
Hardline position: "All parameters for a cryptosystem must always be chosen with the maximal possible degree of randomness, because any extra structure or deviation from randomness might some day be used to attack the system."
Kinder, gentler viewpoint: "A user who requires the highest level of longterm security and is not so concerned about efficiency should have a cryptosystem with randomly generated parameters. On the other hand, a user who needs only short-and middle-term security and is very concerned about efficiency should have a cryptosystem that employs a special class of elliptic curve." By "special class" I mean a curve that has special properties that improve efficiency, and for which no attack is known at present that takes advantage of these special properties to compromise the security of the system. 5.1. Reducing a global curve modulo a prime ideal. Suppose, for example, that E is an elliptic curve
defined over the field Q of rational numbers. If p is any odd prime not dividing the denominators of the coefficients or the discriminant of f (X), then one can consider the elliptic curve E over F p that is obtained by simply reducing the coefficients modulo p.
That elliptic curve will always contain as a subgroup the image of the torsion subgroup E tors (the set of points of finite order) of the curve over Q. But one expects that in many cases the quotient will have prime order.
Question. For a fixed curve E over Q, what can be said about the probability as p varies that #(E mod p) #E tors is a prime number? Can one prove (for any fixed E) that there are infinitely many p for which this number is prime? For more precise conjectures and heuristics see [21] .
This question is analogous to a classical unsolved problem of number theory. Namely, instead of E take the multiplicative system of nonzero integers, which has torsion subgroup {±1}. Then one can ask: As p varies, what can be said about the probability that
#{±1} is prime? Are there infinitely many such "Sophie Germain primes" for which p = 2 + 1 is prime?
2
The question about Sophie Germain primes is of interest when using a DiffieHellman type cryptosystem in the multiplicative group of a prime field F p . The analogous elliptic curve question given above is of interest when using an elliptic curve cryptosystem. In both cases one needs the order of the group to be divisible by a large prime. 2 In 1823 Sophie Germain proved the "first case" of Fermat's Last Theorem for prime exponents for which 2 + 1 is prime. This was the first major result on Fermat's Last Theorem for a large class of exponents.
Remark. The denominator #E tors in the elliptic curve question is often 1, and in any case it cannot be much larger than in the Sophie Germain prime question. According to a deep result of Barry Mazur [33] , there are at most 16 torsion points on an elliptic curve over Q.
Example. Consider the elliptic curve
and let p ≡ 1 (mod 4), p M.
Gauss found a formula for the number of points on E modulo p. Namely, one must first write p in the form A 2 + B 2 (a very easy computational task even if p is very large [3] ). Choose A odd, and choose its sign so that
This number is always divisible by #E(Q) tors = 4, but often it is equal to 4 times a prime number. If the prime number has more than about 160 bits (i. e., about 50 decimal digits), then the group of this elliptic curve modulo p is suitable for elliptic curve cryptography. Most likely,
is prime for infinitely many primes p, but this conjecture is unproved.
5.2.
Randomly chosen coefficients over a fixed prime field. If one generates the coefficients a, b ∈ F p randomly, one then has to find #E(F p ) and determine if this group order has a large enough prime factor. The first polynomial time algorithm to compute #E(F p ) was due to R. Schoof in 1985 [44] . There have been many speed-ups since then, such as a variant of Atkin-Elkies using modular forms. For values of p in the practical range it is now possible to compute #E(F p ) in a few minutes.
It is known that, as the coefficients vary, #E(F p ) is distributed more-or-less uniformly throughout the Hasse interval:
It is reasonable to conjecture that #E(F p ) has ≈ 1/ log p probability of being prime. However, it has not even been proved that the Hasse interval around p + 1 always contains another prime besides p.
5.3. Curves over F q r . Suppose that q is very small (for example, q = 2), r increases, and we consider elliptic curves over F q r with randomly chosen coefficients. In that case it is not even proved (for any fixed q ≥ 2) that there exists a constant B such that all the Hasse intervals around q r + 1 as r varies together contain infinitely many "almost-prime" integers equal to a prime times an integer less than B. In the case q = 2 one is asking whether there exist infinitely many almost-primes the first half of whose bits after the initial 1 are either all 0 or all 1. This seems to be a very difficult open problem.
5.4. Curves defined over small fields. When a curve E defined over F q (with q small) is considered over F q r , it's very easy to compute #E(F q r ) once you trivially count #E(F q ). Namely, let
be the quadratic polynomial associated to E. Then by Weil's theorem we have
we get a simple recursion for the sequence #E(F q r ) that is about as easy to compute as the recursion for the r-th Fibonacci number. Given a curve over a small field F q , we want to work in an extension F q r such that #E(F q r ) is equal to a prime times a small cofactor. Since #E(F q k ) divides #E(F q ) whenever k | , we must choose r prime. The best we can hope for is that
The question of primality of this ratio is analogous to the Mersenne prime question.
Conjecture (see [27] ). For fixed E over F q and variable prime r, the probability that
is prime is about e γ log q log r r ,
where γ is Euler's constant and log denotes natural logarithm.
The most important case in practical ECC is that of the smallest field F 2 .
Definition 2. An anomalous binary curve (ABC) is an elliptic curve
where a = 0 or 1, defined over F 2 .
The associated quadratic polynomial is
The use of these curves was originally proposed in [24] because I saw some efficiency advantages in computing multiples of points, which is the main operation one has to carry out in any implementation of ECC. J. Solinas [51] greatly improved upon my observations, making a detailed study of expansions in the number ring
. These curves are so nice to work with that they reportedly became known as "magic curves" within the U.S. National Security Agency, where Solinas works.
There are two basic ideas in speeding up point multiples on ABC curves: 1. If you are using a normal basis of F 2 r , it takes negligible time to apply the Frobenius map to points:
This map Φ is the action of the element α =
Since #E(F 2 ) = 3 + (−1) a , we work over an extension of prime degree r for which #E(F 2 r ) = 2 · prime when a = 1; 4 · prime when a = 0.
For example, with r = 233 and a = 0 we find that #E(F 2 r ) is equal to 4 times a 70-digit prime. That elliptic curve group is very good for practical cryptography, for both security and efficiency reasons. ABC curves are the only special class of elliptic curves that are approved for practical use by the major industry standards bodies.
This concludes our discussion of "good uses" of elliptic curves in cryptography. The remainder of the paper is concerned with "bad uses."
The Failure of Index Calculus Attacks
The so-called "index calculus" methods provide most of the subexponential-time algorithms both for integer factorization and for the DLP in the multiplicative group of a finite field. Thus, a natural question that arises when evaluating the security of ECC is whether similar techniques might apply to the ECDLP. Following [36] and [52] , we explain why that is highly unlikely. We first give some background about the height function on a global curve.
6.1. Definition of the height. For a nonzero rational number x = a/b written in lowest terms, the height H(x) is defined to be max(|a|, |b|), and the logarithmic height h(x) is defined to be log(H(x)). Note that h(x) is essentially (up to a constant factor) equal to the input length of x in the computer-science sense, i. e., the number of bits needed to write x. The logarithmic height of a pointP = (x, y) on an elliptic curveẼ defined over Q is now defined to be
(For the point at infinityÕ we define h(Õ) = 0.)
Remark. The factor 1 2 comes from the fact that x(P ) is a function "of degree 2." It would be almost the same to define h(P ) to be 1 3 h(y(P )) (since y(P ) is a function of degree 3) or
The logarithmic height function does not quite have nice properties, although it does have nice properties "up to a constant." For example, up to a constant it does not matter which function f was used in the definition
Néron and Tate showed that a slight modification can be made in h(P ) so that the resulting function ofP has the nice properties exactly, rather than only up to a constant. Their functionĥ(P ) is called the "Néron-Tate canonical logarithmic height." Before definingĥ(P ), we note a very important fact about the group law on the curve. If we keep adding a point to itself, the number of bits occupied by the numerators and denominators of the coordinates of kP grows quadratically in k.
We now defineĥ (P ) = lim j→∞ 1 j 2 h(jP ). This definition is independent of which function f (P ) was used to define h(P ). It is also obvious thatĥ(kP ) grows exactly quadratically in k:
We list other basic properties ofĥ(P ):
•ĥ(P ) = 0 if and only ifP has finite order, i. e., P ∈Ẽ(Q) tors .
• OnẼ(Q)/Ẽ(Q) tors ,ĥ(P ) gives a positive definite inner product defined by
For simplicity, suppose thatẼ(Q) has trivial torsion. ThenẼ(Q) ≈ Z r , where r is the rank ; and the canonical logarithmic height makesẼ(Q) into a full lattice in R r . The volume of a fundamental parallelepiped for the lattice is the squareroot of Reg(Ẽ) = det( P i ,P j ) 1≤i,j≤r , whereP 1 , . . . ,P r are a set of generators ofẼ(Q). This determinant is called the regulator of the curve.
Index calculus.
Suppose that we want to solve the ECDLP on a curve E defined over F p . That is, given P, Q ∈ E(F p ), we want to find an integer m such that Q = mP . In practice, P and Q usually belong to a subgroup of E(F p ) of large prime order , where is of almost the same order of magnitude as p. The first step in an index calculus approach is to lift the curve to a curveẼ(Q), that is, to a curve whose equation reduces modulo p to that of the original curve E over F p , and then lift the two points P , Q in the ECDLP to two pointsP ,Q ∈Ẽ(Q), that is, to two points whose coordinates reduce modulo p to those of P, Q ∈ E(F p ).
Since the most likely value of the rank r for a random elliptic curve over Q is either 0 or 1, let us first consider those possibilities. Case 1. The lifted curve has zero rank, i. e.,Ẽ(Q) is a finite group. As mentioned before, by [33] there are at most 16 points onẼ(Q); and the largest prime number that can be the order of a point is 7. Since ECC is going to be taking place in a group of prime order much greater than 7, you simply cannot lift your points tõ E(Q).
Case 2. The lifted curve has rank 1. For simplicity, let us suppose thatẼ(Q) has trivial torsion, i. e.,Ẽ(Q) ≈ Z. LetP 1 be a generator ofẼ(Q).
Suppose that there exist integers s, t with |s|, |t| < B such thatP = sP 1 and Q = tP 1 lift P and Q. Thenĥ (P ),ĥ(Q) ≈ B 2ĥ (P 1 ), and so the lifted points require about
symbols to write down. Now if m is the discrete log that we are looking for, thenQ − mP = (t − ms)P 1 must reduce mod p to the point at infinity on E, i. e.,
where is the order of the group of points of the cryptosystem. But for random m, the probability that |s|, |t| < B exist with t − ms ≡ 0 (mod ) is roughly
Thus, there is only a probability O( k p ) that P and Q can be lifted to points that can be expressed in k symbols.
Remark. The constant in the big-O contains 1/ĥ(P 1 ). So perhaps the situation would not be totally hopeless if we could getĥ(P 1 ) to be extremely small. But that is not feasible, because of Lang's conjecture. (We shall return to this later.) Now let us consider general r, and suppose that we are able to lift a significant proportion of points of E(F p ) to points ofẼ(Q). Here "significant" means not hopelessly minuscule, e. g., > 10 −8 . For simplicity we suppose that E(F p ) is a cyclic group of order generated by P .
Outline of how index calculus would work: 1. Choose a liftingẼ(Q) of E(F p ), and find a basisP 1 ,P 2 , . . . ,P r of linearly independent points onẼ(Q). (For simplicity, here and in what follows we will assume thatẼ(Q) has trivial torsion.) 2. Compute the multiples 2P , 3P , 4P , etc. in E(F p ), and for each k try to lift kP to a point P k ∈Ẽ(Q). Let k 1 , k 2 , . . . be a sequence of values for which this is possible. (Note: For index calculus to work the liftings cannot be related in the obvious way, i. e., k j = jk 1 and P kj = jP k1 .) For each k i express P ki as a linear combination
3. Let P j ∈ E(F p ) be the reduction mod p ofP j , and let u j denote the (at present unknown) discrete logarithm of P j to the base P . After enough multiples k i P have been lifted, we can solve the system of linear congruences
for the unknowns u j .
4. Try to lift Q, Q + P , Q + 2P , Q + 3P , etc. to a point ofẼ(Q), until you find a single such point Q + kP that lifts to Q ∈Ẽ(Q). After expressing Q as a linear combination
you can find the desired discrete logarithm m from
6.3. Why this will not work. Let V r denote the volume of the unit ball in R r . Then the volume of the ball of radius √ B is V r B r/2 , and the number of integer points in R r whose square of distance from the origin is ≤ B is asymptotic to this value. If we want an asymptotic expression for the number of points in some other lattice whose square of distance from the origin is ≤ B, then we must divide the above expression by the volume of a fundamental parallelepiped of this lattice. This gives the result:
Very little is known about how to lift points from E(F p ) toẼ(Q). But a necessary condition for lifting P ∈ E(F p ) is that there be a pointP ∈Ẽ(Q) that reduces to P modulo p and that has reasonable height, i. e., that has coordinates that can be written out in a reasonable number of digits. Thus, in order to be able to lift > 10 −8 p points, for reasonable B we want to have
We probably will not want B to be more than about 100, and we will want p to be at least 10 50 . Thus, we need either r to be large or Reg(Ẽ) to be very small, or preferably both.
However, Reg(Ẽ) can be bounded from below in terms of the r-th power of the length of the shortest vector, which is the square root of µ, where we define µ = miñ P ∈Ẽ(Q),P =Õĥ (P ).
And, according to a conjecture of Serge Lang (see p. 92 of [29] or p. 233 of [47] ), µ is bounded from below by a constant multiple of log |∆|, where ∆ is the discriminant ofẼ.
Next, it is intuitively clear that log |∆| is at least of the order of log p, since the coefficients ofẼ are liftings modulo p of the coefficients of E. Also, it has been proved (under the assumption of certain standard conjectures) that log |∆| r log r.
Putting this all together, we see that there is no way to make Reg(Ẽ) extremely small. And if we try to make r large, we will have to pay a price in terms of increasing Reg(Ẽ). In any case, no elliptic curve has been found with r > 23, even though concerted efforts have been made to produce curves of high rank. Moreover, in practice, one cannot get anywhere near r = 23 with a curve that must simultaneously be a lifting of a given mod-p curve E.
Thus, on any liftingẼ(Q) there are going to be too few points of reasonable height to provide liftings of a significant proportion of points of E(F p ). That is why index calculus will not work. In essence, it is the existence of the height function, which makesẼ(Q) into a lattice in R r , that protects ECC from index calculus attacks.
Remarks. 1. If the finite field is not a prime field, then it would be natural to lift to elliptic curves over a number field. Butĥ generalizes to number fields (see §5-6 of Ch. VIII of [47] ).
2. Another approach would be to lift to elliptic curves over a function field (i. e., over a finite extension of F q (T )). Butĥ generalizes to function fields (see §4 of Ch. III of [48] ).
The Failure of the Xedni Calculus Attack
In August 1998, J. Silverman circulated a description of a new approach to solving the ECDLP. It caused a stir for several reasons. In the first place, it was the first serious attack on an important class of elliptic curve cryptosystems in almost a decade. In the second place, his approach involved some sophisticated ideas of arithmetic algebraic geometry (such as the heuristics of the Birch-Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture) that had never before had any practical application. In the third place, because of the subtlety of the mathematics involved, even people who had had computational experience with elliptic curves were initially unable to give even a rough estimate of the algorithm's running time.
I soon showed that a modified version of Silverman's algorithm could be used to attack both the DLP in a finite field and also integer factorization. Thus, if Silverman's algorithm had turned out to be practical, it would have broken essentially all forms of public key cryptography that are currently in practical use.
A group of us (including Silverman) then undertook a careful analysis of the algorithm, which Silverman had named "xedni calculus" ("xedni" being "index" spelled backwards). First we proved that, under certain plausible assumptions, Silverman's algorithm was asymptotically going to fail. More precisely, its expected running time would be fully exponential as a function of the input length. This did not completely settle the question, however, because the theoretical constants involved were quite large, and so this result did not necessarily rule out the possibility that the algorithm would be feasible for primes in the practical range (of, say, 50 digits). So we had to test various aspects of the algorithm experimentally. The results showed conclusively that the algorithm is very far from being practical. Here I will give only the theoretical part of the argument in [16] , after first describing how xedni calculus works.
7.1. The algorithm. Suppose one wants to solve the ECDLP on an elliptic curve defined over a prime field F p . That is, we must find an integer m such that Q = mP in E(F p ).
We first randomly choose r different linear combinations P j = s j P + t j Q of the points P and Q in E(F p ). Here r is an integer between 2 and 9. Next, we choose r pointsP j in the plane with integer coordinates whose residues modulo p are our points P j ∈ E(F p ). We also choose an elliptic curveẼ(Q) that passes through all of theP j and that reduces modulo p to the curve E(F p ). (For this r can be at most 9.)
Now if we are very lucky, the pointsP j ∈Ẽ(Q) will be linearly dependent in the elliptic curve group, in which case we find integer coefficients α j such that r j=1 α jPj =Õ ∈Ẽ(Q).
Reducing mod p, we find that
is the point at infinity in E(F p ), and so we have
from which we can solve for the discrete logarithm m.
Silverman had various strategies that, at least conjecturally, would increase the probability that theP j are linearly dependent; these will not concern us here.
7.2. The height function protects ECC from xedni as well as index calculus. LetẼ(Q) be the lifted curve constructed in an iteration of the xedni calculus algorithm, and for simplicity suppose that it has trivial torsion. Recall the canonical logarithmic heightĥ(P ), whose properties make it unlikely that index calculus can be adapted for elliptic curves.Ẽ(Q) may be regarded as a full lattice in a vector space V having ĥ as metric. LetP 1 , . . . ,P r ∈Ẽ(Q) be the lifted points that we hope are dependent.
Consider the map from r-tuples of integers toẼ(Q) ⊂ V given by
and suppose that theP j are dependent. Let
and, as before, let µ = miñ
If M/µ is bounded from above by an absolute constant, then it follows from geometry of numbers pigeon-hole argument that the pointsP j satisfy a nontrivial dependency relation whose coefficients α j are bounded from above by an absolute constant C. The idea of the proof of this fact is that there are O(C r ) possibilities for the r-tuple of coefficients, and only O(C r−1 ) possible image-points α jPj , where the constant in the second big-O depends on the bound for M/µ.
If we reduce the points in such a dependency relation mod p, we see that the original P j ∈ E(F p ) must satisfy a dependency with |α j | ≤ C, and there is only an exponentially small probability that this happens.
It remains only to justify the assumed absolute boundedness of M/µ. This follows from two very plausible assumptions (here ∆ denotes the discriminant of E(Q)):
(1) µ ≥ C 1 log |∆| for an absolute constant C 1 ; (2) log |∆| ≥ C 2 M for an absolute constant C 2 . These imply that
Assumption (1) is Lang's conjecture, which has been proved by J. Silverman in many cases. What about (2)? Roughly speaking, assumption (2) says that whenever we pass a curveẼ(Q) through r pointsP j , the size of (i. e., number of symbols needed to write) the curve's coefficients -and hence ∆, which is a polynomial function of these coefficients -is at least of the same magnitude as the size of the pointsP j .
Remark. If you start withẼ(Q), and ifẼ(Q) has nonzero rank, then it is easy to find pointsP j of size much larger than log |∆|. For example, just take multiples of a given point. On the other hand, when you start with the pointsP j and then obtainẼ(Q) by passing a curve through these points, then it is extremely unlikely that you will be able to get a curve whose discriminant has small size compared to the points.
We conclude that asymptotically the Silverman algorithm has at best exponential expected running time O(p) -and this is much worse than that of squareroot attacks on the ECDLP, such as the Pollard ρ method.
Thus, the height functionĥ(P ), by imbeddingẼ(Q) as a lattice in R r , ensures that there are only O(B r/2 ) points of reasonable input-length ≤ B. This is what prevents both the index calculus attack and the xedni calculus attack from having any chance of success.
The Failure of the Torsion-Subgroup Attack
The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is closely related to the Discrete Log Problem. Suppose that we are working in a subgroup of prime order | q − 1 in F × q , and let g be a generator of this group. The DDH is the problem, given g, x = g i , y = g j , z = g k , of determining whether or not k ≡ ij (mod ). If we are working on an elliptic curve with P a point of order and Q = iP , R = jP , S = kP , then the DDH again asks whether or not k ≡ ij (mod ). It is obvious that if we can solve the DLP in a group, then we can solve the DDH there. The converse is probably false in general. However, any progress in solving the DDH, even if it does not lead to an algorithm for the DLP, would be of great cryptographic importance. The result claimed in [6] concerns not the DLP, but rather the DDH.
The authors of [6] consider a subgroup of prime order | p − 1 in F × p . They show that if one is given an elliptic curve, depending on p and , that is defined over a number field and has certain properties, then one can solve any instance of the DDH in the subgroup in polynomial time. They conjecture the existence of elliptic curves with the desired properties. However, in [19] we give evidence that the elliptic curves needed in [6] do not exist. Our main argument is described in §8.3 below. We emphasize that, even if the curves in the conjecture in [6] existed, the result claimed in that paper would not be of practical value unless a reasonable algorithm could be developed to find them. The authors of [6] did not consider this question, and we also will ignore the question of how to find these curves in the unlikely event that they exist.
8.
1. An open problem. At first glance it might seem that, even if a desired object exists, its existence is of no cryptographic value unless one has a reasonable algorithm to find it. However, from a theoretical point of view it is interesting to know the answer to the following question for either the DLP or the DDH.
Open Problem. Does there exist a polynomial-size hint, depending on p and but not on the rest of the input, that, once known, allows one to solve any instance of DDH (resp., of DLP) in the subgroup of order in F × p in polynomial time?
3 From a practical standpoint this would not give us much, because in the absence of any algorithm other than exhaustive search, the time required to find the polynomial-size hint in general is super-exponential, i. e., exp((log p)
O (1) ). On the other hand, to put it as encouragingly as possible, a positive answer to the above question would tell us that, if we are willing and able to expend a tremendous amount of resources for a given p and , we could set up a polynomial-size data bank from which any DDH (resp., any DLP) in that group can be solved very quickly.
8.2.
What is needed for the torsion-subgroup attack. We shall not give details of the method in [6] for solving the DDH. The most important feature of the approach in [6] is that it requires that one have an elliptic curve defined over a number field that has a torsion point of order . Since in practice is a prime of at least 160 bits, this curve would have to have an enormous torsion group.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a number field K. As before, we let E tors (K) ⊂ E(K) denote the subgroup of all torsion points; by the Mordell-Weil theorem, we know that this is always a finite group. Here are the properties that must be satisfied by the number field K and the elliptic curve E in [6] . Let p and be primes with | p − 1. As usual, by "polynomial size" we mean of bitlength (log p)
O (1) . (Since p is usually polynomial in , we shall sometimes write (log )
O (1) instead.) Concerning K, one needs both its degree over Q and the coefficients of a generating polynomial for the field to have polynomial size. Next, the elliptic curve E must be defined over K and have points of order with coordinates in K that all have polynomial size. 4 Finally, all of the prime ideals of K dividing p must have degree 1 (in other words, the residue field is F p ), E must have split multiplicative bad reduction at p (i. e., at some prime ideal of K dividing p), and the points of order must not reduce modulo p to the singular point.
Degree of the number field.
One of the great achievements of the theory of elliptic curves over number fields was the complete proof of the Uniform Boundedness Conjecture (UBC). This remarkable conjecture, now a theorem, says that there exists a bound B(d), depending only on the degree of the number field, such that the torsion subgroup of any elliptic curve E over any number field K of degree d has no more than B(d) elements. The first major result in the direction of proving the UBC was Mazur's theorem for d = 1 (i. e., K = Q) in 1978 [33] . Mazur proved that B(1) = 16, and that 7 is the largest prime that can be the order of a point in E tors (Q).
The d = 2 case of the UBC was proved 14 years later by Kamienny [18] . It turns out that when is a prime greater than 13 there cannot be a point of order in E tors (K) for any quadratic field K. Soon after, the UBC was proved for some larger values of d, and then finally in [35] for all d. Merel [35] also proved the bound ≤ d 3d 2 for primes dividing the order of the torsion subgroup, and Oesterlé soon showed how to improve this bound to ≤ (3 d/2 + 1) 2 (see [14] ). The Oesterlé bound is the best result that has been proved without any restriction on the elliptic curves.
In [6] the basic conjecture upon which the whole paper depends says that as → ∞ there exist number fields K of degree < (log ) O(1) and elliptic curves E over K having points of order . The authors cite Oesterlé's bound as support for this conjecture, and say: "Fortunately, the current research seems to indicate that the maximum possible number of torsions over a number field grows exponentially with the degree of the number field."
But a more dispassionate examination of the literature reveals a somewhat different picture. In addition to Oesterlé's bound, it has been proved that (1) if there is a prime of additive bad reduction, then < 48d (Flexor-Oesterlé [10] ); (2) for curves with good reduction everywhere one has < 1977408 d log d;
and, more generally, if there is a bound s on the number of prime ideals of K where the curve has bad reduction, then there exists a constant c s depending only on s such that < c s d log d (Hindry-Silverman [14] ); (3) for a fixed curve E, considered over varying extension fields of its field of definition, there exists a constant c depending on E such that < cd log d (Masser [32] ). What about the other direction? What families of E(K) are known with points of large finite order? The strongest result currently known comes from fixing a curve E and then considering the same curve over field extensions K of its field of definition. In this way one can obtain points of prime order where is only
The reason is that the x-coordinate of a point of order satisfies the -th division polynomial, which has degree ( 2 − 1)/2; thus, one usually has to go to a O( 2 )-degree extension to get the coordinates of such a point.)
It is an open question whether or not there exists a family of elliptic curves over number fields K that have a K-point of prime order with growing faster than √ deg K. In other words, if is a prime of at least 160 bits, as is the case in cryptography, then no one knows a way of finding a point of order on E(K) unless K is a number field of degree ≈ 2 320 . Several experts in the area have suggested that the torsion , even if it does not satisfy an upper bound as small as √ d, is likely at least to satisfy a polynomial upper bound. This is stated explicitly by S. David 5 and more tentatively by Hindry and Silverman.
6 At present, no one has yet been able to prove a polynomial bound on ; this is still an open problem.
If is bounded by a polynomial in d, then the strategy in [6] immediately fails. That is the main reason to doubt the existence of the curves needed in the torsionsubgroup attack. There are other reasons as well, for instance, the likelihood that curves with d bounded by a polynomial in log , even if they existed, would probably have exponentially large discriminant (see [19] for more details). Moreover, we now look at what modular curve one is dealing with, and conclude that the hope that one would have a polynomial-size point on such a curve takes us well into the realm of the absurd.
8.4. The modular curves X 1 ( ). The purpose of this section is to discuss the curves that parameterize the set of all elliptic curves having a point of order .
Let Γ = SL 2 (Z)/{±1} denote the group of all 2 × 2 matrices with integer entries and determinant 1, considered modulo ± 1 0 0 1 . For each one can consider the 5 "Notons toutefois que ces majorations semblent indiquer que l'ordre de la torsion ne devrait dépendre que polynomialement du degré du corps et non exponentiellement comme c'est le cas en ce moment en [35] ." ( [7] , p. 107.) 6 "Il est naturel de demander s'il existe une borne polynomiale en d." ([14] , p. 97.)
subgroup Γ 1 ( ) consisting of all matrices that are congruent modulo to 1 * 0 1 .
Recall that the isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over C can be identified with the equivalence classes of lattices L = Zτ + Z under the equivalence relation determined by the action of Γ on the complex upper half-plane:
If our element γ ∈ Γ actually lies in Γ 1 ( ), then it fixes (modulo the lattice) the element 1 of order in C/L. That is, Γ 1 ( ) preserves not only the elliptic curve, but also a point of order . Just as Γ-equivalence classes of points in the complex upper half-plane H correspond to elliptic curves, the Γ 1 ( )-equivalence classes of H correspond to pairs consisting of an elliptic curve and a point of order on it.
For any of the groups Γ 1 ( ) we can construct a fundamental domain for its action on H. This means that we find a region D with the property that every point of H is equivalent to a point of D and no two points of the interior of D are equivalent to one another. Some points on the boundary of D are equivalent, so we can visualize the fundamental domain as "glued together" by joining the equivalent points on its boundary. It is a basic result of the theory of modular curves that the fundamental domains can be regarded as algebraic curves defined over Q. The curve coming from Γ 1 ( ) -after it is "compactified" by adding some "cusps," which are a finite number of points not corresponding to elliptic curves -is denoted X 1 ( ). Thus, the non-cusp points of X 1 ( ) parameterize elliptic curves along with a torsion point of order . More precisely, if a (non-cusp) point of X 1 ( ) has coordinates in a number field K, then it corresponds to an elliptic curve defined over K that has a point of order that is also defined over K.
In [33] Mazur proved that for primes > 7 there are no elliptic curves over Q with a point of order . Mazur proved this by studying the family of curves X 1 ( ). Because of the correspondence between non-cusp Q-points on X 1 ( ) and elliptic curves defined over Q with a point of order with coordinates in Q, his result can be given as a statement about rational points on the curves X 1 ( ): if is a prime greater than 7, then X 1 ( ) has no rational points except cusps. Thus, Mazur's theorem is the modular curve analogue of Fermat's Last Theorem, which, of course, can be stated in the form: if is a prime greater than 2, then the curve x + y = 1 has no rational points except the trivial ones (1, 0) and (0, 1).
Recalling the discussion of the Uniform Boundedness Conjecture in §8.3, we can state the result in [35] (as improved by Oesterlé) as follows: for > (3 d/2 + 1) 2 the curve X 1 ( ) has no non-cusp K-points for any degree-d number field K. In order to appreciate the power of the UBC, the reader should notice the contrast with the family of Fermat curves. Already when d = 2 very little is known about points on high-degree Fermat curves with coordinates in quadratic number fields.
The curves X 1 ( ) become quite complicated as increases. One measure of the complexity of a curve is its genus: a rational curve has genus 0, an elliptic curve has genus 1, and a hyperelliptic curve of the form y 2 = x 2g+1 + a 2g x 2g + · · · + a 1 x + a 0 (where the polynomial on the right has no multiple roots and the characteristic is not 2) has genus g. The complex points of a genus-g curve form a Riemann surface with g "holes" or "handles." Asymptotically the genus of X 1 ( ) is ∼ 1 24 2 . Thus, if is a 160-bit prime, the curve X 1 ( ), considered over the complex numbers, looks like a Riemann surface with about 2 315 handles! It is this curve that, according to [6] , needs to have a non-cusp point with coordinates of reasonably small size. Of course, in the absence of a proof that such a point cannot exist, one is free to conjecture whatever one's heart desires, just as one is free to conjecture the existence of little green men walking across the ice fields of Ganymede.
8.5. Conclusion. To a mathematician it might seem strange that, despite some strongly negative comments by expert referees, [6] was accepted for publication in the proceedings of one of the main cryptography conferences. However, the program committee's decision is not surprising if one takes into account the sociology of the cryptographic research community. Many cryptographers are naïve about mathematical techniques. Just as social "scientists" often misuse statistics and mathematical modeling in ways that would horrify a mathematically educated person (for a discussion of a famous example of this, see [22] ), some cryptographers have an exaggerated faith in the applicability of sophisticated mathematics. As a result, they do not apply the same strict standards to submitted papers that are cloaked in high-brow mathematics as they would to submissions that they find easier to read.
Our analysis of the attempted attack in [6] shows once again that one has to be very careful about using elliptic curves over number fields K. Any curve that has enough points of the desired sort is likely to be computationally intractable. In the present case the attackers needed a large number of torsion points. In earlier cases, such as the index calculus analyzed in §6, the cryptanalyst needed high rank. As we have seen, there is reason for skepticism about the possibility of using the structure of the group of K-points of an elliptic curve to mount a successful attack on a cryptosystem.
